



LEwis ET AL., V. RUTHERFORD, 72 S. W. 373 (ARK.)-Where an ancillary ad-
ministrator is appointed to care for a decedent's insolvent estate in a juris-
diction otner than that of the decedent's domicile, held, it is his duty to
pay over to the principal administrator enough to allow all creditors to share
alike.
This decision seems to prescribe the proper course to be followed by
administrators. Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128. Some authorities hold that
it is the duty of the ancillary administrator to satisfy the claims of the
creditors of the State in which he is appointed to the full extent of as-
sets obtainable and only the surplus is to be paid over to the principal
estate. This latter view is supported by the United States Supreme Court,
Smith v. Bank, 5 Pet. 518, 527. Whether the court should decree a dis-
tribution or remit the assets to the principal administrator is a matter of
discretion. Fretu.'ell v. McLem ore, 52 Ala. I24.
ALIENS-NON-RESIDENT-DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT--RIGHT OF ACTION.
-BNTHRON ET UX. V. PHOENIX LIGHT AND FuL Co., 71 PAC. 941 (Auz.).-
The Arizona statute giving a right of action to parents for the wrong-
ful death of their son does not expressly or impliedly exclude non-res-
idents or aliens from its benefit. Held, that residents of Canada may
bring an action thereunder.
The general rule is that non-residents may sue. R. Co. v. Glover, 92
Ga. 132; Philpott v. R. Co., 35 Mo. 164; R. Co. v. Higgins, 85 Tenn. 620;
R. Co. v. Mills, 57 Kan. 687. This has been held not to apply to a non-
resident mother who was an alien, on the ground that no legal liability existed
which made it her son's duty to support her. Deni v. R. Co., 181 Pa. St.
525. See also Brannigan z. Union Gold Mining Co., 93 Fed. 164. The
doctrine of these latter cases has been recently disputed in Massachu-
setts. Vetaloro v. Perkins, IOI Fed. 393; Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266.
In England each view has been recently upheld. Adam v. B. & F. S. S. Co.,
2 Q. B. 430; Davidson v. Hill, 70 L. J. Q. B. 788. Under a special act
giving a right of action to those injured by a death .caused by a riot or
lynching, it has been held that a British citizen could sue, the decision
being based largely upon the ground that the purpose of the statute was
the suppression of murder, and that this could not be accomplished if
a distinction were made against aliens. Luke v. Calhoun County, 52 Ala.
115. See also discussion in 54 L. R. A. 935.
BANKRUPTcY-LIEN-SALE WITHIN FOUR MONTHS PERIOD.-CLARKE V.
LARREMORE, TRUSTEE, 9 Am. B. R. 476, U. S. SuP. CT., FmB. igo3.-Held, that
proceeds of a sheriff's sale held within four months prior to filing a pe-
tition in bankruptcy became subject to the control of the trustee in bank-
508 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
ruptcy where judgment, execution and levy were all within four months
period. White, J. and Peckham, J., dissenting.
By Section 67 f.) of the Bankruptcy Act, liens such as the one giving
rise to the proceeds in question, are rendered null and void "in case thejudgment debtor is adjudged a bankrupt." This decision of the Supreme
Court defines this section to include the proceeds in the hands ofthe sheriff. "The invalidity relates back to the entry of the judgment andeffects all subsequent proceedings." The money in the sheriff's hands takesthe place of the property. Balmer v. Balmer, 2 Lanc. Law Review, ii.
"The rights of the creditor were still subject to interception," and theproceeds do not become his until paid over. Baker v. Kenworthy, 41 N. Y.
215. That the money in the sheriff's hands is "in custodia legis" andnot subject to levy is almost universally held. Turner v. Fendall, I Cranch
116; Conover v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 685; Hardy v. Tilton, 68 Me. 195,;and note. The provision in the section in question excepting bona fide
purchasers only from its operation would seem to lead to a like con-clusion. In re Franks, 95 Fed. 635. But the Supreme Court of New York,
App. Div., held in a recent case that where the money was paid over itdid not come within Section 67 (f.). Levor v. Leitor, 8 Am. B. R. 459. The
dissent was apparently in accordance with this view and with certain recentNew York decisions holding that property in the sheriff's hands belongg
to the creditor. Wehie v. Conners, 83 N. Y. 231.
BANKs-AUTHORITY OF CASKIER-LrAwLITy OF BANK.-TAYLOR V. COM-
MERCIAL BANK, 66 N. E. 726 (N. Y.)-Held, that in the absence of auth-orization, the cashier of a bank has no authority by virtue of his position
to make any representation on behalf of the bank as to the solvency of acustomer who is one of its debtors. Bartlett, O'Brien, and Vann, JJ., dis-
senting.
The rule is laid down in the lower court, 73 N. Y. Supp. 929, and sup-ported by the dissenting opinion that a principal is liable to a third person
for the fraud of his agent, perpetrated by the latter in the course of hisemployment, although the act was ultra vires, and the principal did notknow of it. On the doctrine of ultra vires the decisions are conflicting.
See cases cited in Nowac v. Railroad Co., 166 N. Y. 44. Several
recent cases seem to treat the misrepresentations of a cashier as
governed by principles different from those applicable to otherclasses of agents. Crawford v. Boston Store Mercantile Co., 67 Mo.App. 39; First Nat. Bk. v. Marshall and Ilsey Bk., 83 Fed. 725. Swift v. .ews-
bury, L. R. 9 Q. B. 301, cited by the dissenting judges does not appear to sup-
port their opinion. See also Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2Exch.25 9 . The majority opinion is in accord with the weighf of authority.
American Surety Co. v' Pauly, 170 U. S. 133: Mapes v Sec. Nat. Bk., 8o Pa.
163; Horrigan v. First Nat. Bk., 56 Tenn. 137.
BOUNDARIEs-RIVERS-STATES- CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. -ROBERTS V.
FULLERTON, 93 N. W. III1 (Wis.).-An officer from Minnesota, acting
under the laws of that State, seized plaintiff's fish net staked to the bottom
of the Mississippi River on the Wisconsin side. In an action for dam-ages, held, that the concurrent jurisdiction given by Congress over the
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boundary waters between Wisconsin and Minnesota does not imply con-
current ownership in the land under the water, or in the fish and game
inhabiting the same, butt applies only to persons or things connected with
navigation. Dodge, J., dissenting.
Sovereign rights as regards ownership of the bed of the Mississippi River
coincide with territorial boundaries. Therein the jurisdiction of each State
is exclusive. Concurrent jurisdiction does not empower one State to extend
its police power over the territory of another, regulating the sovereign
property right of the latter to the fish therein. The concurrent jurisdiction
provided for the adjoining States attaches to cases arising out of the com-
merce, of the river but does not authorize the courts of a State to abate
a nuisance in the river beyond the boundary line of that State. Gilbert v.
Mfg. Co., ig Iowa 319; Buck v. Ellenbolt, 84 Iowa 394. Dodge, J., dis-
senting, suggests that there is no distinction between criminal and police
legislation of the State addressed to the subject of catching fish, and; police
or criminal legislation relating to other subjects.
CIVIL RIGHTS-PLACE OF PUBLIC AccoMMODATIoN-BooTBLAcK STAND.-
BENKS v. BESSO, 8I N. Y. Supp. 384.-Under Laws of New York, i8g5, c.
Io42, which provide that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommo-
dations of hotels, barber shops, theaters, "and other places of public ac-
commodation or amusement," the proprietor of a boot-black stand was
held liable for the penalty imposed for breach of the above, because of his
refusal to black the plaintiff's boots on account of his color. Nash and
McLennan, IL, dissenting.
An unlicensed billiard parlor is not a "place of public amusement or
accommodation," Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 95 Mass. 247; neither is a
drug store. Cecil v. Green, i61 IIl. 265. A skating rink has been held
within the statute, People v. King, iio N. Y. 418; but see Bawlin v. Lyon,
67 Ga. 536.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATING THE RATE OF WAGES-CLASS LEG-
ISLATION.-STREET V. VARNEY ELECTRICAL SUPPLY Co., 66 N. E. 895 (IND.).-
The minimum wage law of Indiana enacts that unskilled labor employed
on any public work of the State or of any political division thereof shall
receive not less than twenty cents an hour. Held unconstitutional, in that
by its agency a citizen may be deprived of his property without due pro-
cess of law; and also, inasmuch as it applies only to "unskilled labor," it is
class legislation.
Legislation of this kind has received no favor in the courts. In People
v. Coler, 166 N. Y. I, a statute providing that all laborers upon any public
work should be paid "not less than the prevailing rate of wages," was held
unconstitutional, and the court held broadly that the legislature has no
more right to interfere and control by compulsory legislation the action of
municipal corporations with respect to contract rights of exclusively local
concern, than it has to attempt to regulate the question of wages as between
private citizens. In State v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. 183. a city ordinance en-
acting that laborers should receive not less than $i.so per day. was held
unconstitutional.
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CONTRACTs-LEGALITY-RETRAINT OF COMPErTITION.-NATONAL ENAM-
ELING AND STAMPING CO. v. HABERMAN, 120 FED. 415.-Held, that a re-
strictive covenant which was ancillary to the main lawful contract and
was reasonable might be enforced although unlimited in time and cov-
ering the United States in area.
The reasons for avoiding contracts in restraint of trade as against public
policy have practically disappeared; yet the courts generally decline to en-
force such contracts. Telegraph Co. v. Crane, 16o Mass. 5o. There is no
hard and fast rule as to what contracts are void as being in restraint of
trade, but each case must be judged according to its own facts and cir-
cumstances. The true test would seem to be to consider what is reasonably es-
sential to the protection of the purchaser; and whether, considering the vast
area of some trades and the changed. conditions of business, a contract, evetn
in general restraint of trade, should be pronounced against public policy,
if such restraint is reasonably necessary for the protection of the purchaser,
Quaere. Potteries Co. v, Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 5o7; Watch Co.. v. Roeber,
io6 N. Y- 473.
CRIMINAL LAW-INFoRMATIoN-AMENDMENT.-STATE v. BARRELL, 54 ATL.
183 (VT.).-Held, that an information filed by a state's attorney may be
amended by his successor in office, on leave of the court in which the in-
formation was filed.
This is apparently the first time this -point has been decided. There
is an expression assuming such to be the case in State v. Meachan, 67 Vt.
7o7, but no grounds therefor are stated. In People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49,
it was held that in the absence of the prosecuting attorney the assistant
prosecutor must necessarily .have power with leave of court to make amend-
ments. In the English case of Attorney Gen. v. Henderson, 3 Anstr. 714.
the Solicitor General was permitted to amend an information filed by the
Attorney General, but in this case the same man successively held both
offices. The ground of the present decision is that the state's attorney's oath
is for the faithful performance of his duties, and is not an oath to the
truth of the matters in the information, so as to bar an amendment by a
successor in office.
DrvoRcE-ALIMoNy-AvoIDANCE BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE.-STATE EX
REL. BROWN v. BROwN, 72 PAc. 86 (WASH.).-Held, that a divorced husband,
after remarriage, cannot relieve himself from the payment of alimony on
the ground of the increase of his expenses. Fullerton, C. J., and Anders, J.,
dissenting.
Courts should be slow in the granting of a change of alimony. Bar-
rett v. Barrett, 41 N. J. Eq. 139; Thurston v. Thurston, 38 Ill. App. 464;
and will consider whether the changed circumstances have been brought
about by improper conduct. Fisher v. Fisher, 32 Iowa 20. There may be
a reduction where the husband's faculties or resources have been im-
paired or reduced. Cox v. Cox, 3 Add. Ec. 276; Davies v. Davies, 4 S. & T.
228; State v. Dist. Ct., 14 Mont. 396. An increase of his resources will
justify an increase of alimony. Otway v. Otway, 2 Ph. 1o9; Middleberger
v. Middleberger, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 195. The fact that the husband's income
has been reduced by unprofitable speculation has been held no ground for
RECENT CASES.
a proportionate reduction of alimony. Neil v. Neil, 4 Hag. Ec. 273. But the
propriety of this decision is questioned by Bishop. Marr. and Div., Sec.
430. And an increase through speculation has been taken as a basis for
increase of alimony. Graves v. Graves, io8 Mass. 314. Remarriage in de-
fiance of the decree of divorce and resulting inability to pay is no defence
in a proceeding for contempt for non-payment. Ryer v. Ryer, 33 Hun i16.
JUDGMENT-JOINT-PAYMENT B3Y ONE JUDGMENT DEBTOR-CONTRIBUTION
-DELESHAW ET AL. v. EDELEN, 72 S. W. 413 (TEx.).-Judgment had been
rendered against three joint makers of a note. One of them paid the en-
tire sum due, and took an assignment of the judgment, it being the in-
tention of the parties to the transfer that the judgment be kept alive. Held,
the judgment was nevertheless extinguished.
The court, in reaching this conclusion felt obliged to follow previous
decisions of the state, although itself approving the contrary position.
While cases are to be found which hold that the intention of the parties
to the assignment controls-Campbell v. Pope, 96 Mo. 468,--the prevailing
rule undoubtedly accords with this decision. Black, Judgments, Se. 995.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES-KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT
-PROMISE TO INDEMNIFY-FORM OF ACTION.-OBANHEIM v ARBucLE, 8I
N. Y. SUPP. 133.-A servant was injured by a defective tool which his em-
ployer had promised to repair shortly and in the meanwhile to indemnify
him for any injury sustained therefrom. Held, that tny action by the
servant for the injury must be in tort for negligence and not on the promise.
Woodward. J. disseting.
In New York a promise to repair by the employer whereby the serv-
ant is induced to remain in the employment does not waive the employer's
right to assert the defense that the servant has assumed all the obvious
risks of his employment; Marsh v. Chickering, ioi N. Y. 396; Hannigan v.
Smith, 28 App. Div. 176; Rice v. Eureka Paper Co., 70 App. Div. 336; at
least down to the time when the repairs are to be made. Rice v. Eureka
Paper Co., supra. But this is not the general rule. Hough v. Ry., ioo U. S.
213; Ferriss v. Berlin Machine Works, go Wis. 514; Lyttle v. Ry., 84.Mich.
289; Cooley, Torts, 559-56o. The case decided above would seem to be
more in accord with previous New York decisions and especially Rice v.
Eureka Paper Co., supra, if it had been held that while the additional prom-
ise that the plaintiff should "be taken care of" did not affect the de-
fendant's defense any more than the mere promise to repair would, still,
where there is such an additional promise the injured party might re-
cover on it the full amount of his loss. No authority directly in point
has been found, but see dicta in Rice v. Eureka Paper Co., supra, at p. 353.
MONOPOLIES-COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVATE CONTRACT LIMITED BY INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE-U. S. V. NORTHERN SECURIITIES CO., 120 FED. 721.-A hold-
ing company was incorporated for the purpose of holding the majority
stock of two competing railroads. Held, that any contract or combination
by which the majority of the stock of two competing interstate rail-
roads is transferred to a corporation authorized to hold and vote for
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the same, substantially restricts interstate commerce, and Congress may in
the exercise of the power given by the commerce clause of the constitu-
tion, prohibit such contracts.
It is well settled that the Sherman Act is intended to prevent all
direct restraint upon interstate commerce of any description whatever
and without regard to the reasonableness of the restraint sought to be
imposed. U. S. v. Freight Ass'n, I66 U. S. 290; Addyston Pipe Co.
v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211. This decision extends the operation of the Act
by determining more specifically what combinations are in restraint of in-
terstate commerce. Where a third party acquires a majority of the stock
of two competing interstate railroads the restraint of interstate commerce
is accomplished as effectually as though the two railroads were consoli-
dated under a single charter. It is immaterial that the third party is a
corporation. The general language used indicates an intention to com-
prehend every scheme that might be devised to accomplish that end.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-QUO WARRANTO-LAcHES.-STATE EX REL.
JACKSON V. TOWN OF MANSFIELD ET AL., 72 S. W. 471 (Mo.).-A city was
not legally organized but was permitted to use its franchises for eight
years. The State sought by quo warranto proceedings to deprive the
town of its franchises and privileges to exist as a city. Held, the State was
precluded by its laches.
Laches is not imputable to the government in its character as a sov-
ereign. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 735. Following this
doctrine it would seem that a Statecould not be precluded by its laches.
Yet a municipal corporation may exist by prescription. Jameson v.
People, I6 Ill. 257. This fact shows that a State may be precluded from
an information to deprive a city of its franchises, but on the ground of
acquiesence, rather than laches. State v. Leathernzan, 38 Ark. 81, 9o.
PATENTS-RIGHT TO EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST INFRINGEMENT-IM-
MoRAL USE.-FULLER v.BERGER ET AL., 120 FED 274.-The plaintiff, assignee
of the inventor, used a patented device for detecting bogus coins in its
gambling machines. The defendants without license applied it to gambling
machines of their own make. Held, that the use which the owner of a
patent makes of the invention can not affect his right to an injunction.
Grosscup, Circuit J. dissenting.
What the complainant is doing with his property cannot deprive him
of his right to invoke the protection of the court against infringement.
Saddle Co. v. Troxel, 98 Fed. 620. Courts of equity will not refuse redress
to the suitor because his conduct in other matters not then before the
court may not be blameless. Paper Co. v. Robertson, 99 Fed. 985. There
are, however, contrary decisions. Where a device is capable of being used
for some useful purpose but in reality is used only for gambling purposes,
the injunction will be denied. Novelty Co. v. Dworzek, 8o Fed. 902. The
dissenting opinion is that though the claimant may hold a legal title, the
court is under no compulsion of law to issue the writ. so long as sound
considerations of public morals and conscience forbid.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-ILLEGAL ISSUE OF STOCK-INJUNCTION.-KRAFT v.
GRIFFON Co. ET AL., 81 N. Y. SuPP. 438.-Under a statute declaring that noth-
ing but money shall be considered as payment of any part of the capital stock
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of a corporation, held, that an issue by a corporation of bonus stock to in-
duce the purchase of bonds, may be restrained at the suit of a stock-holder,
although the capital stock of the corporation was so impaired that the market
value of bonds and bonus was covered by payment of the par value of the
bonds alone.
The common law rule that such a sale was valid in the case of a
"goinz concern" when made bona fide for the purpose of continuing busi-
ness. Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, was not followed because of the
express provision in the N. J. Stock Corp. Law (P. L. 1896, p. 293) which
had been construed in Donald v. American Ice Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 729. In
Memphis Ry. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287, the court held that the object of a sim-
ilar statute was "to protect the stockholders from spoilation and to guard
the public against securities that were absolutely worthless" and allowed
a bonus stock issue. See also Peoria etc. Ry. v. Thompson, io3 11. 187, 2oi;
Stei, v. Haward, 65 Cal. 616, the latter being directly in point. For a gen-
eral criticism of similar statutes see Elliott, Priv. Corp., sec. 342.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-MANAGEMENT-REsIGNATION OF DIRECTORS.-
ZELTNER V. ZELTNER BREWING Co. 66 N. E. 81o (N. Y.)-All the officers of
a corporation resigned for the purpose of enabling one of them to apply
for a receiver on the ground that the corporation was without officers to
preserve its assets. Held, that such proceedings were unlawful as tend-
ing to encourage mismanagement of the corporation and to defeat or de-
lay creditors.
Courts have generally placed no limitation on the right of directors
of corporations to resign. Blake v. Ji'heeler, i8 Hun 496. Apparently the
only authority on the question of resignation of all the directors in' a body
is Smith v. Danzig, 64 How. Prac. 320, where it was held that all the directors
may resign when the affairs of the corporation are in a very bad condition
in order that a receiver may be appointed and an equal distribution of
the assets among creditors be secured. The present decision which seems in-
consistent with Sitdh v. Danzig..supra. is supported by I Moraw., Priv. Corp.
563.
PUBLIC POLICY-CONDITION IN DEED-GRAIN ELEVATOR.-WAKEFIELD V.
VAN TASSELL, 66 N. E. 83o. (IL.-A condition in a deed of a small tract
of land in a village, provided that no grain elevator should ever be erected
thereon. Held. not to be void as against public policy, although it prohibited
the building of a public warehouse.
The condition in question was urged to be contrary to public policy
on the ground that it is for the interest of the public to encourage the
building of public grain warehouses, as quasi-public agencies. Upon the
ground that they are such agencies, agreements by railroad companies not
to build a station within a certain distance of property granted to them,
havd been held to lie against public policy. R. R. Co. v. Ryan, ii Kan. 602;
Villiamson v. R. R. Co., .3 Iowa 126. There seems. however, to be a clear
distinction between the two classes of cases. The mere fact that a business
is of public concern is not a 6ufficient reason for overthrowing reasonable
restrictions upon its exercise within a limited area. Chappel z,. Brockway,
21 Wend. 157.
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RAILROADS-ACTIONS-VENUE.-BOYD V. BLUE RIDGE Ry. Co., 43 S. E.
817 (S. C.)-Held, that an action may be brought against a railroad com-
pany in the county in which the president and assistant auditor have their
offices, in the absence of evidence that its principal place of business is
located elsewhere, though its charter provides that such place shall be in
another city.
Whether the opinion holds with the weight of authority is doubtful.
A certificate of incorporation specifying the location of the company's
principal office is conclusive evidence of such location. Pelton v. Trans-
portation Co., 37 Ohio St. 45o The venue should be laid where the cor-
poration resides, i.e. at its place of business. Thorn v. Railroad Co. 26 N. J.
L. 121; Transportation Co. v. Schen, 19 N. Y. 408; Railroad v. Cooper, 30
Vt. 476. That the residence of a corporation is not confined to the
county where its place of business is located, see Rhodes v. Salem T. & C
B. Corp., 98 Mass. 95; Mooney v. Union Pac. Ry. Co,. 6o Ia. 346. See also
Elliott, Railroads, Sec. 623, where the conflicting authorities are discussed.
TAXATION-LOcAL ASSESSMENT-LIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT.-CITY
OF PITTSBURG V. STERRETT SUB-DIsTRICT, 54 ATL. 463 (PA.).-Held, that
an assessment for local improvements authorized by statute, on "any prop-
erty or properties," could not be held to apply to property of a school
district, it being public property and there being no provision for its en-
forcement.
That a constitutional exemption from "taxation" does not preclude lia-
bility for special assessments for local improvements is held by most of
the states. Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190; Matter of Mayor, etc.
of N. Y., ii Johns. 77; Cooley on Taxation, 416; Contra, County v. Boyd,
7o Tex. 237; Von Steen v. City of Beatrice, 36 Neb. 42I. Hence quasi-
public corporations, charitable institutions, churches. etc., merely exempt from
"taxation" are liable to such assessments. Buffalo Cemetery v. Buffalo. 4o
N. Y. 5o6; Lavickley M. E. Church's Appeal, 165 Pa. 475; Boston Seamen's
Friend Soc. v. Boston, rx6 Mass. 18i. The majority of the decisions how-
ever, support the present case in holding that though the state has the power
to subject itself to assessments like the one in question, without vio-
lating a constitutional exemption from taxation-Hassau v. City of Roches-
ter, 67 N. Y. 528-a contrary intention must be presumed. Hence the
property of the state or of its subdivisions or agencies will not be liable
under general assessment laws unless the intention to include such property
be expressly mentioned or clearly implied. State of Conn. v. Hartford, 5o
Conn. 89; City of Clinton v. Henry County, 115 'Mo. 557; Worcester County
v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; Board of Improvement v. School Dist.. 56 Ark.
354. The opposite view is held in Ohio, Iowa, Illinois and apparently in
New York, City of Cincinnati v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec. 362;
Sioux City v. School Dist., 55 Iowa 15o; McLean County v. Bloomington.
x06 Ill. 2o9; Hassau v. City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528.
